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ESSAY
NEW TEXTUALISM AND THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT
Leah M. Litman†
Michele Goodwin’s piece raises important questions about
whether troubling modern-day labor practices in jails and
prisons are consistent with the Thirteenth Amendment.1 In
Goodwin’s telling, the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment formally ended the institution of slavery, but the
Amendment allowed practices resembling slavery to continue,
perhaps reflecting the extant stereotypes and racism that
formally amending the Constitution cannot root out. Indeed,
Goodwin excavates historical materials that suggest the people
who drafted and ratified the Amendment understood and
expected that it would allow the perpetuation of slavery in
another form. As Goodwin explains, most historians have
argued that the Thirteenth Amendment’s punishment clause,
which allows for involuntary servitude “as punishment for a
crime,”2 “was probably meant to preserve the existing system
of prison labor.”3 But she persuasively demonstrates that
these historians “overlook . . . [how] those systems were . . .
racialized.”4 In other words, everyone understands that the
Thirteenth Amendment was drafted to allow the continuation
of prison labor. But while prison labor could—hypothetically—
be a racially neutral system of uncompensated or
undercompensated labor, contemporaries of the Thirteenth
Amendment understood that it was not, in actuality, neutral.
And they expected that it would not be neutral, and that
undercompensated prison labor would be performed by

† Assistant Professor of Law, University of California Irvine School of Law.
Thanks to Michele Goodwin for the very kind invitation to participate in this
symposium and Daniel Deacon for comments on this Essay.
1 Michele Goodwin, The Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism,
and Mass Incarceration, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (2019).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
3 Goodwin, supra note 1, at 932–33.
4 Id.
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primarily black and non-white immigrant populations caught
in a dragnet web of interlocking state and private
discrimination that would push them into the criminal justice
system. Goodwin’s narrative about the Thirteenth Amendment
is a prime example of what Professor Reva Siegel has called
“preservation-through-transformation”—how society and the
legal system reject one form of racial discrimination while at
the same time legitimating other forms of it.5
Goodwin’s project thus pointedly asks what the Thirteenth
Amendment means—was it understood and meant to permit,
and does it permit, a racialized system of prison labor?
Answering that question requires us to think about what the
Thirteenth Amendment means, and Goodwin’s thoughtprovoking article provides an occasion to revisit some of the
ways people have interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment. As
it so happens, the Thirteenth Amendment provides an
abbreviated case study on some of the promises and limits of
constitutional textualism, including the variant of “new
textualism” that has recently emerged.6 New textualism, in
Jim Ryan’s definition, is the promising new form of
constitutional textualism whose “core principle . . . is that
constitutional interpretation must start with a determination,
based on evidence from the text, structure, and enactment
history, of what the language in the Constitution actually
means.”7
But unlike its predecessors, new textualism
recognizes that the semantic meaning of texts can embody
broad principles whose application to particular facts may
change over time, and it welcomes the consideration of nontextual sources like structure or enactment history or
historical context.8
The quest to interpret the Thirteenth Amendment
illuminates how constitutional textualism, in practice, often
involves the kinds of interpretive challenges that its
proponents ascribe to purportedly textual methods of
constitutional interpretation.
These challenges include
reconciling different genres of sources and selecting between
different pieces of evidence based on intuitions about
constitutional substance. Acknowledging that the end goal of
5 Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving
Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1112 (1997).
6 See James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to The Constitution: The Promise of New
Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1524 (2011).
7 Id.
8 See id. at 1538–56.
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constitutional textualism is to determine “what the language
in the Constitution actually means” does not change that;9 nor
does it necessarily provide the kind constraining, anchoring
force that textualism is supposed to offer relative to other
interpretive methodologies. This piece highlights how these
dynamics have played out in the context of the Thirteenth
Amendment with respect to two interpretive questions—what
relevance the historical context behind the Amendment has,
and whether other provisions in the Constitution shed some
light on the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment. It suggests
that new textualism in many respects converges on other
purportedly competing methodologies and that the promise of
the new textualism also represents its shortcomings or at least
the sacrifice of textualism’s comparative advantages over other
methodologies.
I
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
One question that comes up in interpreting the Thirteenth
Amendment is what relevance does the historical context
behind the Amendment have? The Thirteenth Amendment
cases have grappled with how the historical context relates to,
and sheds light on, the meaning of the constitutional text, as
New Textualists maintain it does.10 And it is helpful to survey
different ways in which the law has inscorporated the historical
context behind amendments, primarily with respect to the
Thirteenth Amendment, but also with respect to the
Fourteenth Amendment, as a point of comparison.
What the cases and the comparison among them reveal is
that incorporating historical context can be done at different
levels of generality.11 The choice to define the historical context
at a particular level of generality also involves a fair amount of
interpretive latitude that makes constitutional textualism,
including new textualism, less disciplined or constraining than
its proponents occasionally maintain.12
The cases also
9

Id. at 1524.
Id. (arguing that enactment history is relevant to new textualism), 1526
(same, for historical context).
11 For a more extended discussion of how historical practices and context
can be defined at different levels of generality, see Leah M. Litman, Debunking
Anti-Novelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1409, 1479–87 (2017). For an application of the same
principle in another context, see also Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels
of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1088 (1990).
12 Josh Chafetz takes this argument a step further and argues that selecting
between different historical narratives itself reflects a normative choice about
10

2019]

NEW TEXTUALISM

141

underscore that new textualism, in particular, is an eclectic
methodology; that is, it relies on different genres of sources to
ascertain the legally operative constitutional meaning.
Designating the constitutional text as the primary or
predominant consideration does not change that; a weighted
balancing test that accords a different weight to different kinds
of interpretive factors (such as text, historical context,
structure, and precedent) still amounts to a balancing test that
considers different kinds of evidence.13
If that is not
problematic—and I do not believe that it is—that goes a long
way toward debunking some of the criticisms of purportedly
non-originalist or non-textualist methods of interpretation.14
A. The Thirteenth Amendment
The Thirteenth Amendment provides that “Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.”15
Two foundational cases on the Reconstruction
Amendments, Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil Rights
Cases, offer some examples of how historical context can be
used to interpret the constitutional text.16 Slaughter-House

which histories to continue and depart from. Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented?
Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for a Usable Past, 131 HARV. L. REV.
96 (2017).
13 Ryan, supra note 6, at 1548 (endorsing an approach that is “holistic” and
“relies on text, history, and the structure of the Constitution and the government
it establishes to elucidate the best and truest meaning of the language contained
in the document”).
14 Robert Post & Reva Siegel, How Liberals Need to Approach Constitutional
Theory, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 18, 2007, at 14 (“Americans routinely use many
other forms of persuasion to convince one another about the Constitution’s
meaning. They appeal to text, precedent, history, structure, tradition, purpose,
principle, prudence, and ethical ideas.”); see also Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin
Toh, Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability Problem, 91 TEX. L. REV.
1739, 1762–84 (2013) (explaining and rejecting noncombinability problem);
Adam M. Samaha, Looking Over A Crowd—Do More Interpretive Sources Mean
More Discretion?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554 (2017) (outlining experimental evidence
that suggests adding sources of interpretation reduces interpretive discretion).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
16 Here, although historical context might suggest the methodology is
originalist, new textualists recognize that discerning the meaning of the text
involves drawing from several different kinds of sources, including historical
context. Ryan, supra note 6, at 1532–34. However, originalists like Larry Solum
have argued that new textualism is not different than originalism. See Bellin on
Fourth Amendment Textualism, Legal Theory Blog (Jan. 15, 2019),
https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2019/01/bellin-on-fourth-
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Cases addressed the constitutionality of a Louisiana state law
that required butchers in New Orleans to use a certain
slaughter-house in slaughtering animals.17 Among other
claims, the butchers argued that the law created “an
involuntary servitude” in violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment.18 And the Civil Rights Cases addressed the
constitutionality of a federal law prohibiting private entities
from racially discriminating; the Court examined whether
Congress had the power to enact that law under its power to
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.19
In Slaughter-House Cases, the Court explained why the
Louisiana law did not run afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Court stated that even “[t]he most cursory glance” at the
Amendment
(along
with
the
other
Reconstruction
Amendments) “discloses a unity of purpose, when taken in
connection with the history of the times”20—destroying “[t]he
institution of African slavery.”21 And, the Court continued,
that purpose “cannot fail to have an important bearing on any
question of doubt concerning their true meaning.”22
But how might this historical context bear on the meaning
of those Amendments? One way would be to interpret
ambiguous terms in light of that purpose—that is, to rely on
the historical context to resolve “question[s] of doubt” about
the meaning of the text.23 So, for example, the Court in
Slaughter-House Cases was trying to figure out the meaning of
the word “servitude.” And, the Court explained,
To withdraw the mind from the contemplation of this grand
amendment-textualism.html [https://perma.cc/NL4S-3HC7]. The extent to
which that is true may depend on whether one puts other non-textual or nonhistorical sources—such as structure or doctrine—in the construction bucket or
the interpretation bucket. Loosely speaking, interpretation focuses on the core,
unchangeable meaning of the text, whereas construction relates to how
interpreters (including judges) implement it or construct its practical legally
operative meaning. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction
Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 108 (2010); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism
and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 472 (2013) (explaining
new originalists’ understanding that construction is “essentially driven by
normative concerns,” whereas interpretation is not); Ryan, supra note 6, at 1544
(“Constitutional adjudication is thus distinct from constitutional interpretation.”)
(emphasis added).
17 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 58–59 (1872).
18 Id. at 66.
19 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
20 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 67.
21 Id. at 68.
22 Id. at 67.
23 Id.
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yet simple declaration . . .—a declaration designed to
establish the freedom of four millions of slaves—and . . .
find in it a reference to servitudes, which may have been
attached to property in certain localities, requires an effort,
to say the least of it.”24

In other words, the Court interpreted the terms of the
Amendment in ways that would further the Amendment’s
purpose. Along these lines, the Court emphasized that the
“spirit of these articles” must have “fair and just weight in any
question of construction”; and that “in any fair and just
construction of any section or phrase of these amendments, it
is necessary to look to the purpose which we have said was the
pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they were designed
to remedy.”25
But Slaughter-House Cases established some limits on
what the historical context could and could not do. The Court
continued:
[W]hile negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress
which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other
kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the
Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the
Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this
amendment may safely be trusted to make it void. And so if
other rights are assailed by the States which properly and
necessarily fall within the protection of these articles, that
protection will apply, though the party interested may not
be of African descent.26

Here, the text of the Amendments limits the amount of work
that purpose can do—the text forbids slavery and servitudes of
any kind, not just of particular races, even though the Court
acknowledged that the purpose of the Amendments was the
destruction of “[t]he institution of African slavery.”27
There are other ways of considering historical context as
well—such as consulting common or understood meanings of
a phrase. The Court did some of that too and again anchored
its analysis to an assessment of the Amendment’s purpose. In
24 Id. at 69; see also id. at 71 (“[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one
pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without
which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of
the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the
protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those
who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.”).
25 Id. at 72.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 68.
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Slaughter-House Cases, the Court reasoned that “[t]he word
servitude is of larger meaning than slavery, as the latter is
popularly understood in this country, and the obvious purpose
was to forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery.”28
And in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court explained that “[u]nder
the Thirteenth Amendment, it has only to do with slavery and
its incidents.”29 It then proceeded to explain how
decisionmakers should interpret those terms:
The long existence of African slavery in this country gave us
very distinct notions of what it was, and what were its
necessary incidents. Compulsory service of the slave for the
benefit of the master, restraint of his movements except by
the master’s will, disability to hold property, to make
contracts, to have a standing in court, to be a witness
against a white person, and such like burdens and
incapacities were the inseparable incidents of the
institution.30

Finally, in both Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil Rights
Cases, the Court tied its bottom-line conclusions to the
historical context behind the Thirteenth Amendment. After
reciting the Amendment’s purpose, the Court in SlaughterHouse Cases ended its analysis with this cursory statement:
The Amendment’s history was “all that we deem necessary to
say on the application of that article to the statute of Louisiana,
now under consideration.”31 In other words, the historical
context behind the Amendment was enough to make clear why
the Louisiana law did not violate the Amendment.
The Civil Rights Cases had a longer passage that yoked the
Court’s conclusion to the historical context behind the
Amendment. The Court framed the “only question” in the case
as “whether the refusal to any persons of the accommodations
of an inn, or a public conveyance, or a place of public
amusement . . . does inflict upon such persons any manner of
servitude, or form of slavery, as those terms are understood in
this country.”32 And the Court answered that question in the
negative:
Many wrongs may be obnoxious to the prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment which are not, in any just sense,
incidents or elements of slavery. . . . What is called class
28
29
30
31
32

Id. at 69.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883).
Id. at 22.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1872).
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 23.

2019]

NEW TEXTUALISM

145

legislation would belong to this category, and would be
obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but would not necessarily be so to the
Thirteenth, when not involving the idea of any subjection of
one man to another.33

The Civil Rights Cases expanded on this analysis as follows:
“[A]n act of refusal has nothing to do with slavery or
involuntary servitude. . . . It would be running the slavery
argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of
discrimination.”34 And just to press the point further, the
Court explained:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and
when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected
in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are
protected. There were thousands of free colored people in
this country before the abolition of slavery, enjoying all the
essential rights of life, liberty, and property the same as
white citizens; yet no one, at that time, thought that it was
any invasion of their personal status as freemen because
they were not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white
citizens, or because they were subjected to discriminations
in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns, public
conveyances,
and
places
of
amusement.
Mere
discriminations on account of race or color were not
regarded as badges of slavery.35

These opinions all used historical context to shed light on the
meaning of the constitutional text. But they used historical
context in different ways—resolving ambiguities in the text in
a way that would further the Amendments’ purposes;
consulting common or understood meanings of a phrase in
light of contemporary events; and limiting the reach of the
Amendments by relying on shared expectations or
understandings about the Amendments’ scope.36

33

Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 24–25.
35 Id. at 25.
36 Ryan, supra note 6, at 1544 (approvingly describing a new textualism
method where the “examination of history includes not simply the specific
enactment history, but the broader historical context surrounding the
enactment”).
34
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B. The Fourteenth Amendment
While Goodwin’s piece focuses primarily on the Thirteenth
Amendment, assessing the different textual moves that might
be made with respect to the Thirteenth Amendment is easier
with a point of comparison—the different textual moves that
are made with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that:
“[N]or shall any state . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”37 The two
foundational cases on the Thirteenth Amendment, SlaughterHouse Cases (and the Civil Rights Cases) addressed
Fourteenth Amendment claims in addition to Thirteenth
Amendment claims.
The Slaughter-House Cases analysis is illuminating in
what it says about the relationship between text and historical
context.38
Slaughter-House Cases quickly rejected the
possibility that the Louisiana law on butchers might offend the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court explained:
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a
class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come
within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a
provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong
case would be necessary for its application to any other. 39

Thus, because the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was
so obviously to prohibit racial discrimination, it did not extend
to other forms of discrimination.
Of course, Slaughter-House Cases was wrong about what
the ultimate scope of the Equal Protection Clause would come
to be. Today, the clause does protect against other kinds of
discrimination in addition to discrimination based on race—
such as discrimination based on sex,40 discrimination based
on sexual orientation,41 or any animus-laden distinctions
between persons.42
37

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
The Civil Rights Cases is less illuminating because it focused primarily on
the state action question. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 15–16 (1883).
39 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872).
40 See U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–33 (1996).
41 Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077–79 (2017); Sessions v. MoralesSantana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017) (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2587, 2603 (2015)).
42 U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (invalidating food
38
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But the judicial implementation of the Equal Protection
Clause continues to distinguish between discriminations
based on different kinds of characteristics. The doctrine
maintains that classifications based on certain characteristics,
such as race, are subject to the highest degree of scrutiny,43
and that classifications based on other characteristics, such
as sex and perhaps sexual orientation, are subject to
intermediate scrutiny.44 It also maintains that other kinds of
classifications, while they might be unconstitutional, are
subject only to the weakest kind of judicial scrutiny—rational
basis review.45
With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike the
Thirteenth Amendment, Slaughter-House Cases appeared to
rely on historical context only as a way to limit the reach of the
Amendment
by
consulting
shared
expectations
or
understandings about the scope of the Amendments. And
existing doctrine has continued to reflect that distinction,
albeit in the doctrine that judicially implements the
Amendments, rather than in construing the Amendment’s
meaning or scope.
C. (New) Constitutional Textualism and the Reconstruction
Amendments
The use of historical context to interpret the constitutional
text raises some interesting issues about the theory and
practice of constitutional textualism. These issues include: (1)
the relationship between the text and the context in which it
was enacted; (2) the interpretive choices that are baked into
textual interpretation (including new textualism) that cannot
be boiled down to simple, mechanical formulas; and (3) the
blurry lines between historical context and some ostensibly
stamp restriction because it was designed to discriminate against hippies); City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating
refusal to grant housing permit for home for the intellectually disabled).
43 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207–08 (2016);
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720–
21 (2007); id. at 837 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Nonetheless, in light of Grutter and
other precedents, I shall adopt the first alternative. I shall apply the version of
strict scrutiny that those cases embody.”).
44 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531–33; Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690.
45 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10 (2016)
(explaining differences in the standard of review); see also Leah M. Litman,
Unduly Burdening Women’s Health, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 50, 55–58 (2017)
(elaborating on this distinction); Leah M. Litman, Getting to No on Roe, TAKE CARE
(July
5,
2018),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/getting-to-no-on-roe
[https://perma.cc/D5BC-5ZXU] (same).
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forbidden considerations in constitutional interpretation (at
least according to certain theories of interpretation, and in
particular textualism). All of these issues point toward the
“sacrifice” that the new textualism might make—it foregoes
some of the differences (and purported advantages over) other
methods of interpretation by recognizing that different sources,
particularly historical context, can shed light on the meaning
of the text.46
The use of historical context in constitutional textualism
raises questions about how to reconcile text and historical
context. When can the historical context broaden the text, or
narrow it? Most people tend to think that historical context
cannot change the meaning of the text, and that view is
reflected in the cases on the Thirteenth Amendment.47 But
texts are susceptible to different interpretations, and historical
context offers a way of selecting between them. And different
aspects of the text can do the same thing—that is, different
facets of the text can pull in different directions just as
historical context can.
This, then, raises the possibility of weighing different kinds
of evidence—“pure” text on the one hand and historical context
on the other—against one another. Consider, for example, an
argument that the Slaughter-House Cases acknowledged that
cuts against its interpretation of the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendment:48 Whereas the Fifteenth Amendment specifically
prohibits abridging a person’s right to vote “on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude,”49 the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibits any form of “slavery []or involuntary
servitude,”50 and the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states
from denying “any person . . . the equal protection of the laws,”
on any basis.51
Thus, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment’s omission of any specific mention of race
suggests the protections of those Amendments extend beyond
racial discrimination or involuntary servitudes or slavery of
particular racial groups. That cuts in the opposite direction as
46 This phrase borrows from Thomas Colby’s article of the same title, which
is explained infra. See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of The New Originalism,
99 GEO. L. J. 713 (2011).
47 See supra text accompanying notes 25–27.
48 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71–72 (1872) (“It is true that only the
fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by speaking of his color and
his slavery. But it is just as true that each of the other articles were addressed to
the grievances of that race, and designed to remedy them as the fifteenth.”).
49 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
50 U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
51 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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the historical context of the Amendments—the textual point
suggests the Amendments reach more than just discrimination
based on race, whereas the historical context suggests they are
uniquely concerned with racial discrimination.
These are competing pieces of evidence, and they are also
different kinds or genres of competing evidence. Yet the
possibility that both pieces of evidence would enter into the
constitutional analysis does not seem to raise the kind of
incommensurability problems that are sometimes associated
with critiques of multi-faceted forms of constitutional
interpretation that do not exclusively focus on one kind of
source, such as the text, or on the original meaning of the text.
These critiques maintain that it is not possible to weigh
different kinds of constitutional authority—text, precedent,
original meaning, practice, or implications—against one
another.52 Other scholars have explained at length why the
incommensurability problem is not a particularly significant
issue for eclectic forms of constitutional interpretation.53 And
Thirteenth
Amendment
textualism
supports
those
explanations and defenses of eclectic methods of interpretation
in as much as it shows how different modes of constitutional
argument can be sensibly weighed against one another, with
an eye toward answering the ultimate question in
constitutional cases—discerning the legally operative
constitutional meaning.54
But if Thirteenth Amendment interpretation suggests that
some interpretive challenges are less challenging than they
might appear, it also suggests that other interpretive
challenges may be more challenging. Specifically, using
historical context to interpret the text involves several
interpretive choices that cannot readily be boiled down to a
simple formula. And in that sense, the constraint that
textualism offers is more analogous to the kind of constraint
that most theories of interpretation offer. All theories of
interpretation constrain judges, and the cases that sought to
52 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and
The Combinability Problem, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1739, 1762–84 (2013) (summarizing
objection before rejecting it).
53 See id.; see also Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory,
87 CALIF. L. REV. 593, 607–08 (1999); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1187 (1987)
(considering how to weigh structure and doctrine when they point in different
directions).
54 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications
for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1290 (2015).
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interpret the text of the Thirteenth Amendment underscore
that all of the different interpretive methodologies (including
textualism) also involve balancing different considerations at
one point or another in their analysis.
The use of historical context, in particular, involves
another series of choices about how to read the relevant
history. It is no secret that history is often messy and
complicated, or that historical narratives can be described at
different levels of generality.55 And the historical context
behind the Thirteenth Amendment is no exception. At various
points, the cases discussing the historical context of the
Thirteenth Amendment describe that context as the institution
of African slavery56 (or, slightly differently, the destruction of
the institution of slavery57); at a slightly higher level of
generality, the “subjection of one man to another”;58 on another
formulation, “discrimination against the negroes as a class, or
on account of their race”59; or (in modern cases) discrimination
“on the basis of race.”60 All of these descriptions are rough cut
but fair descriptions of the historical context behind the
Thirteenth Amendment. And selecting between them—at their
varying levels of specificity or generality—may result in
different interpretations of the Amendment, and different
applications of it.
That is all fine and good; interpretation inevitably involves
some degree of discretion and some amount of choice. But
recognizing that this kind of discretion and choice is a part of
textualism (or at least a part of textualism that is attentive to
historical context) should reduce the extent to which
proponents of textualism can insist that their theory avoids the
kind of interpretive choices that they sometimes implicitly or
explicitly represent are uniquely part of other theories of
interpretation. Linguists have already pointed out some of the
ways in which that is not the case: Textualism, like all kinds
of interpretation, involves a significant amount of interpretive
choice,
including
through
the
phenomena
of

55 Litman, Anti-Novelty, supra note 11, at 1479–87 Novelty; Chafetz, supra
note 12.
56 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 9 (1883).
57 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1873).
58 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 23–24.
59 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 81.
60 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207–08 (2016);
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720–
21 (2007).
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“entextualization,” which occurs when interpreters pick the
relevant “chunk” of text to focus on.61 The case study of
Thirteenth Amendment textualism supplements that
scholarship by highlighting other choices that are also part of
textualism, or at least some variants of it.
Finally, the use of historical context to interpret the
Thirteenth Amendment illustrates some of the ways textualism
can smuggle in some ostensibly forbidden considerations, or
at least considerations that the theory of textualism, according
to its proponents, was meant to shift away from. In particular,
historical context sometimes blurs together with purpose, and
textualism is often described or pitched as an alternative to
purposivism, which is defined as a focus on the official,
objective purpose(s) of a law.62 All of the discussion of the
historical context behind the Thirteenth Amendment focused
on the animating goal(s) of the Amendment. “[W]hen taken in
connection with the history of the times,” the Court declared,
“a unity of purpose” became clear.63 The Court described its
understanding of the historical context as a “design[] to
establish the freedom of four millions of slaves.”64 Both of
these references to history are about the purpose that
contemporaries would have attributed to the Thirteenth
Amendment.
That is striking insofar as proponents of
textualism often trumpet it as an alternative to purposivism,
which its critics sometimes dismissively depict as an
unconstrained and largely free-wheeling judicial inquiry.65
The use of historical context in the cases on the
Reconstruction Amendments also illustrates some of the fuzzy
boundaries between the original public meaning of a text and
its expected applications. The distinction between the two is
relevant insofar as modern versions of originalism tend to
61 Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking
Legislative Intent, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1651 (2014); Anya Bernstein, Before
Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 567 (2017).
62 Richard Re has made a similar point about some of the Court’s recent
statutory interpretation cases. See Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18
GREEN BAG 2d 407 (2015).
63 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 67.
64 Id. at 69; see also id. at 71 (“[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one
pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without
which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of
the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the
protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those
who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.”).
65 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 1509, 1532–33 (1998) (summarizing critique before challenging it).
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focus more on the former, rather than the latter, for a variety
of reasons.66 But the distinction between the two is not always
clear, nor is it particularly stable. In part for that reason,
Michael Dorf warned of what he deemed the originalism twostep—interpreters’ ability to shift back and forth between a
text’s public meaning and its expected applications depending
on the context.67 For example, some originalists interpreted
the text at a high level of generality when analyzing the
constitutionality of laws restricting marriage to heterosexual
couples: In that instance, interpreters read the Equal
Protection Clause as forbidding laws that subordinate one
group to another, particularly with respect to a societally
important institution.68 But when analyzing other issues,
originalists interpret the text at a much more specific level of
generality.69
For example, to determine whether laws
restricting women’s access to medical procedures terminating
a pregnancy, interpreters maintain that the text could not
forbid laws that were common at one point in history.70 But
the same could be said for laws restricting marriage to
heterosexual couples.

66 Litman, Anti-Novelty, supra note 11, at 1450; Dorf, Undead Constitution,
infra note 69, at 2020.
67 See also Ryan, supra note 6, at 1533 (“Although the shift to original
meaning was significant as a matter of theory, it often changed little in practice.
Conservatives were often unwilling to follow this refined version of originalism
when it would lead to liberal outcomes by courts.”).
68 See Ilya Somin, Originalism is Broad Enough to Include Arguments for a
Constitutional Right to Same-Sex Marriage, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 28,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/01/28/originalism-is-broad-enough-to-includearguments-for-a-constitutional-right-to-same-sexmarriage/?utm_term=.01bc85ac3b1c [https://perma.cc/Z5P6-VVJL]; see also
Peter J. Smith, Originalism and Level of Generality, 51 GA. L. REV. 1, 23–48 (2017).
Dorf also gives as an example of academic arguments that seek to justify the
claim that discrimination on the basis of sex is unconstitutional. Dorf, Undead
Constitution, infra note 69 at 2031–34 (citing Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T.
Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011)).
69 See Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011,
2032–34 (2012) (book review) (citing Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers
for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 695–98 (2009)).
70 Jim Ryan generalized: “Conservatives, however, continued to rely on what
the framers and ratifiers said about the Constitution. This is not in itself
controversial, because the statements and understandings of the founding
generations constitute some evidence of what the language meant when adopted.
What was (and remains) controversial is that conservatives often relied
exclusively on what the ratifiers and framers believed the Constitution required
in certain contexts in order to establish the meaning of the text. Put differently,
they relied on the expectations of the framers and ratifiers rather than the actual
language in the document.” Ryan, supra note 6, at 1534–35.
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The same back-and-forth between public meaning and
expected applications is evident in the Thirteenth Amendment
cases too. The Slaughter-House Cases’ and the Civil Rights
Cases’ discussion of the historical context behind the
Thirteenth Amendment ranged from the very general (“[t]he
institution of African slavery”71) to the very specific (“the refusal
to any persons of the accommodations of an inn”72). And
importantly, the Court seamlessly switched back and forth
between discussing the historical context as a background
principle to the Amendment (which comes closer to
approximating original public meaning) and discussing the
historical context as a way of testing whether contemporaries
would understand the text to mean that a particular law is
unconstitutional (which starts to look like the expected
application of the text).73
The back-and-forth between public meaning and expected
applications has some particularly problematic consequences
in the context of these cases. Specifically, the Civil Rights
Cases used contemporaries’ expected applications about the
Thirteenth Amendment as a basis to legitimate private forms
of discrimination.74 It also used contemporaries’ shared
understandings about the Thirteenth Amendment to
mistakenly put some conceptual space between slavery and
racism, as well as to suggest that the institution of slavery was
separate from race and racism.75
Of course, this is but one limited case study in how
textualism has worked. But it points in the direction of some
limitations to the “new textualism” that mirror some of the
limitations to the “new originalism.” In his article, The Sacrifice
of The New Originalism, Thomas Colby explained the trade-off
that newer forms of originalism make.76 Colby argues that
more modern forms of originalism came to focus on original
public meaning, rather than original intentions, to avoid many
of the criticisms with relying on original intent.77 These
71

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 68 (1873).
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23–24 (1883).
73 See supra text accompanying notes 33–36.
74 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
75 See id.; Richard A. Primus, The Riddle of Hiram Revels, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1680, 1723 (2006) (“The argument here was straightforward. Race and slavery
were legally independent.”).
76 Colby, supra note 46.
77 Colby, supra note 46, at 736–44; see also Ryan, supra note 6, at 1532 (“For
conservatives, the shift to original meaning provided a stronger theoretical base
for originalism. Everyone could agree that the text of the Constitution, at least
when clear, counted as law.”).
72
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criticisms include the claim that intentions, rather than
enacted text, do not amount to law, and the concern that
relying on the framers’ intentions or expectations would
produce some rather intolerable results (such as the
unconstitutionality of paper money, and the continued
inequality and disenfranchisement of women and AfricanAmericans, among other things). But focusing on original
public meaning—and particularly in accepting that the original
public meaning was potentially capacious enough to mean that
laws prohibiting same-sex marriage are unconstitutional, or
that laws prohibiting abortion are unconstitutional, or that
laws segregating public schools are unconstitutional—
sacrificed one of the main benefits that originalism purportedly
offered: constraining judges, and reducing their ability to make
freewheeling, policy-laden determinations.78
Something similar could be said about the new textualism.
Specifically, the new textualism’s acknowledgment that the
constitutional text can adopt and reflect general principles,
and that the meaning of the constitutional text can be
discerned by examining many different kinds of sources (such
as historical context, or purpose, or structure, or other texts)
both more accurately reflects how interpretation works, and
also improves on some of the shortcomings of more wooden
forms of textualism. But in the process, it may sacrifice some
of the constraints that textualism was supposed to offer, or at
least complicate some of the arguments for why textualism is
superior to other interpretive methodologies, including the
constraint it imposes on judges. And that has had significant
consequences for the legal doctrine that governs Congress’
ability to enact legislation to carry out the promises of the
Thirteenth (and Fourteenth) Amendments.
Scholars have already pointed to a similar dynamic—
sacrifices entailed in efforts to improve—when it comes to
statutory textualism.79 Both John Manning and Richard Re
have argued that professed textualists occasionally broaden
their purported textualist inquiries to include consideration of

78 Colby, supra note 46, at 744–64. New Originalism distinguishes between
constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction; construction
involves the “process of fashioning constitutional doctrine and applying it to [a]
particular issue[],” whereas interpretation involves determining the actual,
semantic meaning of the words of the Constitution. Id. at 766–67.
79 This may also reflect the dynamic Jeremy Kessler and David Pozen
identified in Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A
Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819 (2016).
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other sources, such as context and structure, or legislative
object or purpose.80 And, in doing so, these scholars have
suggested that these purported textualist methods may
sacrifice or compromise on several of the advantages of
textualism.
Perhaps it is possible to perform an analysis of the text
that always manages to focus on original public meaning
rather than expected applications, or an analysis of the text
that is not bound up with normative choices about how to read
history or structure. But if the theory of constitutional
textualism—or at least the strain of it tied to original public
meaning—is perfectible, its practice is far from it.81
II
INTERTEXTUALISM
The Thirteenth Amendment also provides an occasion to
think about another occasional move in textualism,
particularly new textualism—intertextualism, which is the
effort to interpret similar words or phrases in the Constitution
to mean similar things and to read different wording choices
as a significant indicator of constitutional meaning.82 At least
when applied to the Thirteenth Amendment, intertextualism
might not have the kinds of interpretive payoffs it is supposed
to have; intertextualism, rather, reveals how the text can often
cut in different directions, just like other kinds of sources can.

80 John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113; Re, supra
note 62.
81 Cf. Colby, supra note 46, at 769 (“When its apparent methodological
compatibility with the New Originalism is recognized, Blaisdell might serve as an
illustration of the inability of the New Originalism to constrain judges or obviate
outcomes despised by many champions of originalism.”).
82 A recent example of intertextualism is the Chief Justice’s dissent in
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 S.
Ct. 2652, 2687 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The unambiguous meaning of
‘the Legislature’ in the Elections Clause as a representative body is confirmed by
other provisions of the Constitution that use the same term in the same way.”
He then goes on to survey other uses of the term within the Constitution:
regarding section 2 of Article I, “This reference to a ‘Branch of the State
Legislature’ can only be referring to an institutional body. . .”; regarding Article
IV, “The references to ‘the Recess of the Legislature of any State’ and ‘the next
Meeting of the Legislature’ are only consistent with an institutional legislature”;
regarding Article IV, “but the only natural reading of the Clause is that ‘the
Executive’ may submit a federal application when ‘the Legislature’ as a
representative body cannot be convened”; and regarding Article VI, “this provision
can only refer to the ‘several State Legislatures’ in their institutional capacity.”
(emphasis added)).
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A. Thirteenth and Eighth Amendments
The Thirteenth Amendment provides that slavery and
involuntary servitude shall not exist “except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”83
Goodwin’s piece focuses on labor practices in modern jails. Are
those practices immune from constitutional scrutiny because
they amount to “punishment for crime[s]”?
One reason to think not is that the labor practices
Goodwin writes of are not themselves necessarily imposed “as
a punishment for crime,”84 which is what the Thirteenth
Amendment exempts from the constitutional prohibition.
Rather, the persons engaged in labor in jails were sentenced to
jail time; and in jail, they were contracted out as laborers.85
But the labor—or involuntary servitude, if it rises to that
level—was not what the judge ordered or imposed on the
defendant at the time of sentencing.
One way of testing that intuition would be to look
elsewhere in the Constitution for when the word “punishment”
is used. It shows up in the Eighth Amendment, which provides
that “excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”86
Would an interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment that
maintained labor practices in jails are not constitutionally
permissible “punishments” also mean that labor practices in
jails (or any treatment of inmates in jails) are not subject to
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, because they are not
“punishments”?
Perhaps. But the word “punishment” is used in slightly
different ways in both Amendments. The Thirteenth
Amendment prohibits involuntary servitude “except as a
punishment,” whereas the Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel
and unusual punishments” from being “inflicted.” The former
refers to the act of the imposition of punishment, whereas the
latter focuses more on punishment at the moment it is
experienced by the individual subject to it—hence the verb
“inflicted”—without any reference to the person or entity
inflicting it.
Thus, perhaps the former’s focus on the
imposition of punishment, rather than the experience of it,
means that labor practices in jails could not constitute “a

83

U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (emphasis added).
85 Some labor practices may be imposed as punishment, either at sentencing
or in prison.
86 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
84
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punishment” for purposes of the Thirteenth Amendment, but
could still constitute punishments for purposes of the Eighth.
Intertextualism, in other words, can identify different
interpretive moves.
It at least raises a concern about
interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment in a way that would
suggest any labor ordered by prison administrators could
never amount to “punishments” under the Eighth Amendment,
even if it does not resolve it. It is less clear, however, that
intertextualism can definitively resolve these questions.
B. Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
What might a comparison between the Fourteenth and
Thirteenth Amendments tell us about the Thirteenth
Amendment? The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “nor
shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws,”87 whereas the Thirteenth
Amendment provides that “neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude . . . shall exist” except for certain exceptions?88
One possible inference concerns whether the Amendments
only prohibit intentional harms based on how the two
Amendments focus on subjects versus objects.89
The
Thirteenth Amendment focuses on a prohibited result, or state
of affairs—“slavery [and] involuntary servitude . . . shall [not]
exist,” whatever their sources.90 By contrast, the Fourteenth
Amendment focuses on the actions of the state; the Fourteenth
Amendment specifically prohibits the state from denying equal
protection—“Nor shall any state . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”91 That clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment (“Nor shall any state”) is the
source of the “state action” doctrine of the Fourteenth

87

U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. This is in addition to the textual similarity
between the two, relative to the Fifteenth Amendment.
See supra text
accompanying notes 48.
89 Cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 1209, 1210 (2010) (“The Constitution prohibits not objects but actions.
Judicial review is the review of such actions. And actions require actors: verbs
require subjects. So before judicial review focuses on verbs, let alone objects, it
should begin at the beginning, with subjects. Every constitutional inquiry should
begin with a basic question that has been almost universally overlooked. The
fundamental question, from which all else follows, is the who question: who has
violated the Constitution?”); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the
Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2011).
90 U.S. CONST. amend XIII.
91 U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
88
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Amendment.92
But that feature of the Fourteenth Amendment may do
some other work too. In particular, the Court has interpreted
the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit only intentional
discrimination. That is, the Court has said that policies do not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment merely because they
produce racially disparate effects; policies are unconstitutional
only if they intentionally produce disparate racial burdens. 93
And the Fourteenth Amendment’s text, which focuses on the
subject of the forbidden action—rather than the objects, or
parties burdened by it—might be a point in favor of that
interpretation.
But the reverse is true in the case of the Thirteenth
Amendment. That Amendment does not focus on the source
of the forbidden action; it focuses on the result (slavery or
involuntary servitude). In the case of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the text singles out the subject—the entity doing
the forbidden action.
In the case of the Thirteenth
Amendment, the focus is different. Viewed in that light,
intertextualism might suggest that the Thirteenth Amendment
is not merely concerned with intentional wrongs or government
purposes.
It is instead concerned with the results of
government or private policies.
With that in mind, the labor practices that Goodwin writes
of take on a different light—and a more troubling one at that.
For if the Thirteenth Amendment, as Slaughter-House Cases
reminded us, was uniquely concerned with servitudes inflicted
on African Americans, modern-day labor practices in jails
disproportionately burden communities of color, as they are
disproportionately subject to criminal sanctions.
Those
differential burdens might trigger some concerns under the
Thirteenth Amendment. And unlike in the case of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the text of the Thirteenth Amendment
might suggest that it does not matter whether those disparate
burdens were imposed intentionally or not.
On closer inspection, however, that comparison might not
yield quite so significant an interpretive payoff. The Thirteenth
Amendment forbids slavery and involuntary servitudes “except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
92

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11–15 (1883).
Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979). For a paper critiquing
this framework by excavating a contrary framework in federal courts designed to
suss out state discrimination against federal rights, see Leah M. Litman, State
Discrimination Against Federal Rights (manuscript, on file with author).
93
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duly convicted.”94 That exception arguably isolates the reason
why an involuntary servitude has been imposed, which
suggests the Thirteenth Amendment is more like the judicial
implementation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which focuses
on government purposes, and the reasons for the government’s
actions. Here, too, intertextualism raises some interesting
points of comparison and possible inferences, but it is less
clear that it definitively resolves them.
***
The point of this Essay is not to suggest that textualism
and textualist decisions are all made up, or that textualism
does not constrain judicial decision-making and can generate
any result.95 Far from it. The point is, instead, to suggest that
constitutional textualism, as evidenced by a case study on the
Thirteenth Amendment, works the way that all other theories
of constitutional interpretation do. It grapples with having to
reconcile different kinds of sources; it deals with competing
evidence that pulls interpreters in different directions; and it
involves relatively unguided decisions that call on interpreters’
intuitions about constitutional substance, or the purpose or
animating principles behind a constitutional provision.
Textualism is not unique in that respect—it is just not
obviously worse or better.
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
Cf. Ryan, supra note 6, at 1560 (arguing that some critics of textualism
and new textualism “suggest that constitutional interpretation has little or no
attractive force independent of the results it produces”).
95

